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Abstract
Friendship is commonly assumed to reduce strategic uncertainty and enhance tacit
coordination. However, this assumption has never been tested across two opposite
poles of coordination involving either strategic complementarity or substitutability.
We had participants interact with friends or strangers in two classic coordination
games: the stag-hunt game, which exhibits strategic complementarity and may
foster ‘‘cooperation’’, and the entry game, which exhibits strategic substitutability
and may foster ‘‘competition’’. Both games capture a frequent trade-off between a
potentially high paying but uncertain option and a low paying but safe alternative.
We find that, relative to strangers, friends are more likely to choose options
involving uncertainty in stag-hunt games, but the opposite is true in entry games.
Furthermore, in stag-hunt games, friends ‘‘tremble’’ less between options, coordi-
nate better and earn more, but these advantages are largely decreased or lost in entry
games. We further investigate how these effects are modulated by risk attitudes,
friendship qualities, and interpersonal similarities.
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1 Introduction
Coordination problems arise widely in social and economic contexts: from teams in
the workplace (e.g., Lazear and Shaw 2007) to organizations (e.g., Milgrom and
Roberts 1992); from collective actions (e.g., Chwe 2013) to macroeconomics (e.g.,
Cooper and John 1988).
From a game-theoretic perspective, coordination problems are characterised by
multiplicity of Nash equilibria. As such, they pose a problem of equilibrium
selection, which has been suggested to constitute ‘‘the most difficult problem in
game theory’’ (Camerer 2003, p. 336). Most of the experimental research to date on
equilibrium selection in coordination games has focused on how structural features
(e.g., payoffs) of coordination games affect equilibrium selection and, consequently,
the potential of social closeness as a coordination devise has remained largely
unexplored (e.g., Camerer 2003; Devetag and Ortmann 2006).
Economics has traditionally assumed a parsimonious ‘‘social void’’ of homoge-
neous individuals (Charness et al. 2007a, b),1 whereas other social sciences tend to
explain social behaviour by assuming that individuals are heterogeneous along
various important dimensions such as their degree of relatedness (e.g., Hamilton
1964), their interpersonal similarities (e.g., McPherson et al. 2001), or their group
membership (e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1979). These factors portray the notion of a
social space in which, since very early infancy (e.g., Meltzoff 2007), across cultures
(e.g., Apicella et al. 2012), and even across species (e.g., Massen and Koski 2014),
tuning behaviour to the ‘‘social closeness’’ of others seems to be the rule rather than
the exception in social interactions. Here, we turn to such a social space and ask
whether social closeness, and friendship as a paradigmatic instantiation of
closeness, may play a role as a coordination device.
So far, a number of experimental studies have shown that many different forms
of social closeness impact significantly on economic decisions, generally by
increasing prosocial behavior.2 Friendship makes no exception: several economic
experiments demonstrate how friendship strongly predicts trustworthiness (Glaeser
et al. 2000); has positive effects on microcredit repayments (Abbink et al. 2006);
boosts reciprocal behaviour (Reuben and van Winden 2008); enhances dictator
giving (Leider et al. 2009; Goeree et al. 2010); increases favoritism in variants of
trust games (Brandts and Sola` 2010). However, no study has asked whether the
positive association between friendship and coordination is stable across opposite
families of games, namely games of strategic complements and substitutes.
1 Notable exceptions are Charness et al. (2007a, b), Cobo-Reyes and Jime´nez (2012), Chen and Chen
(2011), and Ga¨chter et al. (2019). Charness et al. (2007a, b) prove how salient group membership
increases coordination rates in a battle of the sexes game. Cobo-Reyes and Jime´nez show the efficiency-
reducing effect of social closeness in two novel asymmetric coordination games. Chen and Chen (2011)
evidence how lab-induced group identity improves coordination in a two-player weak-link game with a
continous action space. Ga¨chter et al. (2019) demonstrate the efficiency-enhancing effect of pre-existing
social closeness in a four-player weak-link coordination game with five possible actions.
2 For instance, this is the case for proximity in social network (Apicella et al. 2012), artificial group
membership (Balliet, Wu, & Dreu, 2014 for a meta-analysis), natural group membership (Bernhard,
Fischbacher, and Fehr 2006), social identification (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996), motor
synchronization (Wiltermuth and Heath 2009), and interpersonal similarity (Cole and Teboul 2004).
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Games of strategic complements involve strategies that mutually enforce one
another: that is, players have incentives to match their actions. For instance, putting
in a few extra hours of work to complete your part of a group task on time may be
worthwhile for everyone only if the other colleague does the same, and wasteful
otherwise. By contrast, games of strategic substitutes involve strategies that offset
one another, and consequently, players have incentives to mismatch their actions.
For instance, co-workers might prefer to run their computations on the most
powerful server, but if all do so at the same time, this could lead to a longer
computational time for everyone. Thus, one should only use the most powerful
server if he or she expects the other will not do so and vice versa.
Similar game structures extend to a variety of situations involving more than two
players. Consider a case of strategic complements as the decision of joining a
protest. The chances of a successful protest increase with the number of people
joining it; however, joining is risky, because one would not want to protest alone.
Consider now a case of strategic substitutes as firms’ decisions to bring their product
to a target market: it could be profitable if not too many firms do the same, to avoid
a price war. Notably, strategic complements are known to foster cooperation (e.g.,
Camerer and Fehr 2006; Potters and Suetens 2009), while strategic substitutes
involve finite resources which are conducive to competition (e.g., Camerer and
Lovallo 1999).
Hoffman et al. (1996) define social closeness as ‘‘the degree of reciprocity that
subjects believe exist within a social interaction’’ (p. 654—italics added). Based on
this, we conjectured that friends, relative to strangers, might be at an advantage
when they are to coordinate on options that mutually benefit one another (i.e.,
matching choices in one-shot games with strategic complements), but that this
advantage might be reduced—or even reversed—when they are to break the
‘‘degree of reciprocity’’ and coordinate on opposite choices (i.e., mismatching
choices in one-shot games with strategic substitutes). For example, suppose that, out
of love for a friend (e.g., player’s prosocial preference), a player wants to pick the
option that most benefits their friend and, by expecting that their love will be
reciprocated, believes their friend will do the same (e.g., player’s beliefs). Under
strategic complements, this is clearly optimal given that players have incentives to
match their actions, and both preferences and beliefs point in the same direction. On
the other hand, under strategic substitutes, preferences and beliefs can run against
one another: out of love for their friend, a player may want to leave the most
profitable option to their friend, but if she/he believes their friend will do the same,
then no one will take advantage of the most profitable option, which is clearly
suboptimal. This dilemma is strongly reminiscent of the following considerations by
Karl Popper: ‘‘That love as such may be unable to settle a conflict can be shown by
considering a harmless test case, which may pass as representative of more serious
ones. Tom likes the theatre and Dick likes dancing. Tom lovingly insists on going to
a dance, while Dick wants for Tom’s sake to go to the theatre. This conflict cannot
be settled by love; rather, the greater the love, the stronger will be the conflict.’’
(Popper 1945/2011, p. 441). In synthesis, under strategic complements, prosocial
preferences and beliefs act synergistically, while this need not be the case for
strategic substitutes.
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To investigate the impact of social closeness in coordination games with strategic
complements and substitutes, we have participants interact with either a friend or a
stranger in two classic two-player games with real monetary payoffs: in ‘‘stag-hunt’’
games, due to the existence of strategic complements, players have the incentive to
match their choices; conversely, in ‘‘entry’’ games, due to the existence of strategic
substitutes, players have the incentive to mismatch their choices. In both stag-hunt
and entry games, subjects face the same potential monetary payoffs. Specifically,
they face a binary decision between an option involving uncertainty (i.e., yielding
either $15.00 or $0, depending on what the other chooses), henceforth referred to as
the ‘‘UP’’ action (short for ‘Uncertain Payoff’), and a lower paying but safe
alternative (e.g., worth $7.50 for sure, regardless of what the other chooses),
henceforth referred to as ‘‘SP’’ (short for ‘Sure Payoff’) action. In both games, the
UP action thus requires coordinating with others, while the SP does not. The only
difference between games is the consequence of choosing the UP action. In the stag-
hunt game, players can jointly obtain the highest payoff (equal to $15) only if they
both choose UP; in other words, the highest payoff requires a player to opt for UP
and their opponent to match such a choice. By contrast, in the entry game, a player
receives the highest payoff of $15 if they choose UP, while their opponent does not,
namely the opponent needs to mismatch. To isolate the effect of social closeness
from learning, here, we focus on one-shot games.
In such a framework, we define ‘‘strategic uncertainty’’ as uncertainty related to
the players’ behaviour in a situation with interdependent decisions (Brandenburger
1996). Following Heinemann et al. (2009), we operationalise and measure strategic
uncertainty as to the probability of choosing the UP action (such that a higher
probability of choosing actions involving uncertainty reveals lower strategic
uncertainty). To control for individual risk attitudes, we conduct a lottery task
modelled as a game against ‘Nature’ with the same potential payoffs as those
featured in the coordination games. As possible mediational factors of the impact of
friendship on strategic uncertainty, we inspect friendship quality, perceived
interpersonal similarities, and the frequency of past interactions, which have been
shown to be an adequate proxy for future interactions (Zhang 2001). Finally, in
addition to strategic uncertainty, we investigate how friendship affects prosocial
choices; other coordination-related measures (such as the degree to which subjects
‘‘tremble’’ by switching back and forth between uncertain and safe actions); and the
rates of expected coordination and payoffs.
We find that, relative to strangers, friends are more likely to choose options
involving uncertainty in stag-hunt games, but the opposite is true in entry games.
Moreover, friendship increases prosocial behaviour in both games, but the effect is
much smaller for entry games. Friends coordinate better, ‘‘tremble’’ less and earn
more than strangers in stag-hunt games, but these advantages are either decreased or
are entirely lost in entry games. These findings are robust to controlling for
participants’ risk attitudes, friendship quality, friends’ perceived similarities, and
frequency of past interactions. Taken together, these results suggest that the impact
of social closeness on coordination problems is clear and beneficial in games
involving strategic complements, but that this is not the case in games with strategic
substitutes.
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The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the study methods.
Section 3 reports on the results. Section 4 discusses the implications of the empirical
evidence. Section 5 concludes.
2 Methods
2.1 Tasks
2.1.1 Coordination games
The experiment has two parts, which participants encounter in sequence before
taking the post-experimental questionnaire.3 In the first part, participants play two
distinct two-player coordination games: stag-hunt games and entry games. The
payoff matrixes for the stag-hunt games and for the entry games are respectively
detailed in Table 1. The payoffs represent dollar amounts. Each participant plays 20
variants of each game and each variant is characterised by a different dollar value of
X 2 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 6:5; 7; 7:5; 8; 8:5; 9; 9:5; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14; 15f g (Nagel et al.
2017). Finally, each variant is played twice: once with a stranger and once with a
friend (amounting to 80 decisions in total). Therefore, this experiment presents a
within-subject design with two treatments: the Stranger treatment and the Friend
treatment.
As we are interested in one-shot games, participants do not receive any feedback
on game plays until the end of the experimental session. Moreover, to reduce
excessive task switching, the stag-hunt games and the entry games are played in
separate blocks, the order of which is counterbalanced across participants. Within
each block, the level of social closeness (i.e., friend vs. stranger) and the values of
the sure payoff X are randomized without replacement. Therefore, each block
entails 40 decisions: 20 decisions (one per value of X) having as counterpart a friend
and 20 decisions (again, one per value of X) having as counterpart a randomly
selected stranger (with replacement).
For each game play, participants view the dollar value of the sure payoff (e.g.,
$8.50) on one side of their computer screen (labelled ‘‘A’’), and the fixed $15 on the
other (labelled ‘‘B’’) (the sides are randomized). Thus, the two coordination games
visually differ only by what is written next to the uncertain $15 option. Stag-hunt
games have the following text: ‘‘$15.00 only if your counterpart chooses B, 0.00 if
your counterpart chooses A’’; entry games simply invert the positions of A and B in
the text: that is, ‘‘$15.00 only if your counterpart chooses A, 0.00 if your counterpart
chooses B’’. Participants are informed about whom they are matched with for their
current decision. Specifically, they either read ‘‘You are matched with a stranger’’ or
‘‘You are matched with [friend’s name]’’, followed by this text: ‘‘You are both
reading these same instructions. You both have to choose between the following two
options: A or B. Which one do you prefer?’’ A screenshot for the stag-hunt game is
reproduced in Appendix B (Fig. 2).
3 The experiment was computerised in Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Povo). Full instructions are available in
Appendix A.
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Participants are informed that for each game play in the stranger treatment,
they will be matched with a randomly selected participant from the experimental
session: this could be a different person each time or the same person, but
participants are told that the stranger cannot be their friend. Participants are also
informed that, at the end of the experimental session, one of their decisions will
be randomly drawn, and that they will be paid according to the outcome of that
decision. For example, if a decision from the stranger treatment is drawn, then
participants are randomly paired with a non-friend counterpart and paid according
to their actual choices.
2.1.2 Lottery task
After playing the coordination games, in the second part of the experiment, subjects
take part in a lottery task to elicit individual risk attitudes, which have been shown
to correlate with strategic uncertainty (Heinemann et al. 2009; Chierchia et al.
2018). The lottery task is set up as a game against ‘Nature’ resembling the above
coordination games: participants choose between the sure payoff option SP and the
risky-payoff option RP; if chosen, option SP yields the sure payoff X, regardless of
the state of Nature. By contrast, option RP could lead to $0 if the state of Nature is A
or to the highest payoff equal to $15 if the state of Nature is B. Participants know
that the state of Nature will be determined by a blind lottery draw yielding A or B
with a 50/50 probability. The payoff matrix of the lottery task is reported in Table 2.
The sure payoff X assumes the exact same 20 values used for the coordination
games. Therefore, participants are expected to make 20 decisions (i.e., one for each
of the 20 dollar values assigned to SP) in the lottery task.4
A screenshot of the lottery task is reproduced in Appendix B (Fig. 3). To further
stress the difference between the lottery task and the coordination games, at the start
of each experimental session, we draw participants’ attention to an empty opaque
box in which we openly place one yellow ball and one blue ball. It is then explained
to participants that, at the end of the session, a single ball will be blindly drawn, and
that the lottery-task payoff will depend on which one of the two balls is drawn.
Visually, in each lottery choice, the colour of the winning ball is randomized (i.e., in
Table 1 Coordination games
Column player Column player
SP UP SP UP
Row player SP X, X X, 0 Row Player SP X, X X, 15
UP 0, X 15, 15 UP 15, X 0, 0
a. Stag-hunt game b. Entry game
4 In addition, participants took part in a second identical lottery task in which p was unknown to
participants. This was done only for replication purposes (Chierchia, Nagel, and Coricelli 2018) and is not
discussed further.
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some lottery choices participants are asked to bet on ‘‘blue’’ while in others to bet on
‘‘yellow’’).
2.2 Post-experimental questionnaires
Following the lottery task, participants complete a post-experimental questionnaire
consisting of two main sets of items: those of the McGill Friendship Questionnaire
(‘‘MFQ’’ for short—Mendelson and Aboud 1999) and those of a novel ‘‘similarity
measure’’. Specifically, as a robustness check of our treatment manipulation,
participants respond to the MFQ tapping into several dimensions of friendship
quality.5 Moreover, since interpersonal similarities are one of the best-known
predictors of friendship formation (Montoya et al. 2008) and have been shown to
play a role in tacit coordination (Chierchia and Coricelli 2015), we measure
participants’ perceived similarities with their friends. Adapted from Chierchia and
Coricelli (2015), our similarity measure consists of 20 person-descriptive words
(e.g., funny, disciplined, opinionated, etc.—see Appendix D for a complete list of
words and screenshot of the task) that participants rate on a continuous scale ranging
from - 50 to ? 50. For each word, the rating is made twice: the first time,
participants rate how well the word describes themselves (‘‘self-ratings’’); the second
time, they rate how well it describes the friend that is sitting in the lab with them
(‘‘friend ratings’’). In both cases, the value of ‘‘0’’ on the scale represents how well
the word describes an ‘‘average’’ student from their own university. We use the
Pearson’s correlation between self-rating and friend rating as a ‘‘perceived similarity
measure’’, given that it measures the degree to which friends think that they are more
likely than the average student from their own University to have similar traits.6
Finally, as a possible proxy for future interactions, we ask participants how
frequently they met their friends in the recent past (Zhang 2001). We do this by
means of a single question: ‘‘During the past 6 months how regularly have you seen
[friend’s name], on average?’’ Participants respond by selecting one of the following
options: ‘‘every day’’; ‘‘every four days’’; ‘‘about once a week’’; ‘‘about once every
Table 2 Lottery task: game
against nature
State of nature
A B
p = 1/2 (1 - p) = 1/2
Player SP X X
RP 0 15
5 Since the MFQ subscales were all highly inter-correlated (all correlations: Spearman q[ 0.729,
p\ 0.001), we aggregate across all items and take this resulting average MFQ score as a general measure
of friendship quality (henceforth MFQ index).
6 The perceived similarity measures are on average positive (mean = 0.284; std. dev. = 0.338) and imply
that friends believe they are more likely than the average student from their own University (the
‘‘stranger’’ in our experiment) to be described by the same traits (one-sample t-test against a zero mean:
t(77) = 7.425; p\ 0.001). Moreover, our similarity measure does not predict general friendship quality
(Spearman q = 0.045, p = 0.696), as measured by the MFQ index.
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other week’’; ‘‘about once a month’’, which we code respectively from 5 to 1 to
generate our variable frequency of past interactions.7
2.3 Participants
Seventy-eight participants took part in the study across four experimental sessions
conducted at the Los Angeles Behavioural Economics Laboratory (‘‘Label’’) of the
University of Southern California. Students from a wide range of academic
disciplines were recruited by both ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and flyers. The average
duration of each session was 84 min. Participants were paid individually and
anonymously at the end of each experimental session.8
Participants were required to bring a non-romantic friend to the experimental
session. Upon arrival, they were randomly assigned to individually shielded
computer cubicles. Instructions were read aloud and followed on individual
handouts. Then, participants answered several control questions to ensure their
understanding of the instructions and they could progress to the next stage only after
providing the correct answers.
While participants were completing the post-experimental questionnaires, we
downloaded their responses from the Qualtrics website and ran an in-house script to
randomly match the participants; select at random the decision relevant for payment
and determine participants’ experimental earnings according to their actual
decisions. All procedures were approved by the local ethical committee.
2.4 Measures and hypotheses
2.4.1 UP actions
Our main interest lies in understanding the effects of friendship on strategic
uncertainty across coordination games of strategic complements and strategic
substitutes. Thus, we first construct the variable ‘‘UP action’’ by coding choices as 1,
if the UP action is chosen, and 0 otherwise; then, we operationalise strategic
uncertainty as the probability of choosing UP actions (such that a higher probability
of choosing UP actions reveals lower strategic uncertainty). We hypothesise that
friendship may decrease strategic uncertainty in stag-hunt games (i.e., higher
probability of UP actions), but not necessarily in entry games, where friendship may
even increase strategic uncertainty (i.e., lower probability of UP actions).
2.4.2 Prosocial actions
A natural question is whether these effects of friendship on strategic uncertainty are
entirely driven by prosocial preferences. As argued in the introduction, prosocial
7 Unsurprisingly, the MFQ index correlates with the frequency of past interactions among friends
(Spearman q = 0.519, p\ 0.001).
8 Fifty-five percent of our participants were females, with an overall sample average age of 20.5 years
(std. dev.: 3.1).
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preferences for one’s friend (e.g., love) may induce friends to choose the UP action
more frequently than strangers in the stag-hunt game and the SP actions in the entry
game. We thus code both these actions (with a value of ‘‘1’’) into the ‘‘prosocial
action’’ dummy variable. We hypothesise that if friendship only operates through a
prosocial preference channel (i.e., holding beliefs constant across games), it will
equally increase the probability of prosocial actions in both games. Any differential
impact of friendship on prosocial actions across games suggests that beliefs may at
least partially mediate the effect of friendship on strategic uncertainty.
2.4.3 Trembling
‘‘Trembling’’ refers to subjects switching back and forth from the UP to the SP
actions (or vice versa) across game plays. Trembling is likely to evidence
inconsistent decisions in stag-hunt games, while it is additionally compatible with
increased reasoning in entry games (Chierchia et al. 2018; Nagel et al. 2017). We
hypothesise that friendship would decrease trembling in the stag-hunt, but not in the
entry game. Thus, to construct our trembling variable, we proceed as follows: for
each game, we first order the 20 variants in ascending order, based on the sure
payoff value; then, we dummy code each variant (with the exclusion of the first
variant which by construction has $0 sure payoff) with a ‘‘1’’ if the choice had
changed relative to the previous variant, and with a ‘‘0’’ if it had not.
2.4.4 Coordination and payoff rates
As performance-related measures, we focus on coordination and payoff rates. To
compute coordination rates we proceed as follows. For the Friend treatment, we
calculate for each participant in the stag-hunt game (resp. entry game) the
percentage of times they matched (resp. mismatched) their choices with their friend
across the twenty game variants. For instance, if participant ‘‘i’’ matched (resp.
mismatched) their choices with their friend 18 out of 20 times, then i’s percentage is
90% and the coordination rate is thus 0.90. On the other hand, for the Stranger
treatment, we compute for each participant in the stag-hunt game (resp. entry game)
the percentages of times they could match (resp. mismatch) their choices with any
other stranger playing the same game variant. We do so to reduce the noise inherent
in the player random matching of the Stranger treatment. Then, we average across
the percentages from each variant to calculate the coordination rate. For instance, if
participant ‘‘j’’ in the Stranger treatment chooses the UP action in a stag-hunt game
variant with a $5 sure payoff, and 78% of the other stranger players choose the UP
action on that same variant, then j’s percentage of matching (resp. mismatching)
actions for the $5 sure payoff variant is 78%. In the Entry game, everything else
being equal, if j chooses the SP action instead of the UP action, their coordination
rate is (1–0.78) = 0.22. We then average over the percentages so obtained across all
the 20 game variants in the Stranger treatment to compute the coordination rate.
Notably, it can be easily shown that coordination rates and payoff rates may
markedly differ (e.g., consider the case of full coordination on UP actions vs. full
coordination on SP actions: these two cases would imply different payoffs). We thus
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proceed to also computing payoff rates as follows: if a participant chooses the UP
action, the payoff is simply the maximum payoff (i.e., $15.00) multiplied by the
coordination rate; while if a participant chooses the SP action, their payoff is
unconditionally the sure payoff value (i.e., in the example above: $5). In this
fashion, we computed payoff rates for each treatment and proceeded to investigate
how they were affected by friendship. We hypothesise that friendship could increase
coordination and payoff rates in the stag-hunt game, but less so in the entry game.
2.5 Statistical and econometric analyses
Strategic uncertainty, prosocial behavior, as well as trembling are analysed using
generalized mixed effect logistic regressions, clustering data at the participant level.
As predictors, we use sure payoff, game and friendship, as well each possible two-
way interactions between these factors (Tables 3,4 and Appendix C—Tables 5, 6,
7). In line with the previous literature on strategic uncertainty (e.g., Chierchia et al.
2018), we also inspect whether the hypothesised effects of friendship are robust to
controlling for risk attitudes, as measured by the proportion of risky actions chosen
in the lottery task. We additionally inspect the individual and aggregate role of the
three potential mediators of the friendship effect on strategic uncertainty: perceived
similarity, friendship quality, and frequency of past interactions (models 1–3,
Table 4). Coordination and payoff rates are analysed with OLS regression. These
latter regressions include the same predictors of previous models, but they omit the
sure payoff variable as they focus on averages computed across variants with
Table 3 Investigating UP actions: mixed-effects logistic regressions
Estimation method: mixed-effects logistic
Controls for individual effects: clustering
Dep. variable: UP action (dummy)
Model 1 Model 2
Sure payoff - 0.251*** (0.015) - 0.251*** (0.015)
Stag-hunt game (dummy) 2.418*** (0.187) 2.417*** (0.187)
Friend counterpart (dummy) - 0.658*** (0.154) - 0.658*** (0.154)
Stag-hunt game*Sure payoff - 0.115*** (0.019) - 0.115*** (0.019)
Friend counterpart*Sure payoff 0.048*** (0.018) 0.048*** (0.018)
Stag-hunt game*Friend counterpart 1.732*** (0.148) 1.732*** (0.148)
Risk 2.478*** (0.647)
Constant 1.469*** (0.160) 0.425 (0.311)
No. observations 6196 6196
No. individuals 78 78
Log-likelihood - 2904.980 - 2898.199
(Robust) Standard errors are in parentheses
***Significance at the 1 percent level
123
G. Chierchia et al.
different payoff values (Appendix C, Table 7). (All of our econometric results go
through when nesting participants within their friendship pairs.)
3 Results
3.1 Friendship and strategic uncertainty
A mixed effect logistic regression (Model 1, Table 3) reveals that friendship
significantly interacts with the game environment by increasing the log odds of a UP
action in the stag-hunt (Stag-hunt Game*Friend Counterpart equal to 1.732) while
decreasing it in the entry game (Friend Counterpart equal to - 0.658). These
effects appear very stark in Fig. 1, which builds on this logistic regression.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, friends are more likely to choose the UP action than
strangers in stag-hunt games; by contrast, friends seem less likely to do so in entry
games (Model 1, Table 3); these effects are also reliably observed when controlling
for individual differences in risk attitudes (Model 2, Table 3). The empirical
patterns shown in Fig. 1 also demonstrate that participants react as expected to the
game incentives (e.g., deviation costs) in that increasing sure payoffs decrease the
Table 4 Friendship quality as mediational factor: mixed-effects logistic regressions
Estimation method: mixed-effects logistic
Controls for individual effects: clustering
Dependent variable: UP action (dummy)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Sure payoff - 0.209***
(0.016)
- 0.208***
(0.016)
- 0.208***
(0.016)
Stag-hunt game (dummy) 1.665*** (0.528) 1.722*** (0.533) 1.706*** (0.535)
Stag-hunt game*Sure payoff - 0.136***
(0.031)
- 0.140***
(0.031)
- 0.142***
(0.031)
MFQ index - 0.021 (0.098) - 0.005 (0.094) 0.039 (0.116)
MFQ index*Stag-hunt game 0.459*** (0.076) 0.485*** (0.078) 0.590*** (0.100)
Similarity index - 0.821**
(0.386)
- 0.823**
(0.383)
Similarity index*Stag-hunt game - 0.567* (0.340) - 0.560 (0.342)
Frequency of past interactions - 0.071 (0.112)
Frequency of past interactions*Stag-hunt
game
- 0.163* (0.095)
Constant 0.968 (0.635) 1.098* (0.612) 1.091* (0.607)
No. observations 3112 3112 3112
No. individuals 78 78 78
Log-likelihood - 1325.301 - 1320.408 - 1318.275
(Robust) Standard errors are in parentheses
***Significance at the 1% level
**Significance at the 5% level
*Significance at the 10% level
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probability of UP actions. This impact of sure payoffs further interacts with
friendship, such that the difference between friends and strangers increases with
sure payoffs in the stag-hunt games, but decreases with sure payoffs in the entry
games. Correspondingly, the effects of friendship are prominent at opposite sure
payoff ranges in the two games, namely at low sure payoffs in the entry game and at
high sure payoffs in the stag-hunt. This is unsurprising given that these sure payoff
ranges are where normally coordination failures are more likely amongst strangers
(Chierchia et al. 2018; Heinemann et al. 2009; Nagel et al. 2017), thus, introducing
greater leeway to detect any friendship effect.
In Table 4, further econometric analysis suggests that the effect of friendship on
choices is partially mediated by friendship quality, which significantly interacts with
the game environment in determining the log odds of UP choices. Specifically,
friendship quality has no impact on the odds of UP choices in entry games, but
increases these odds in stag-hunts. In line with this, simple correlational analyses
suggests that friendship quality is associated with a greater proportion of UP actions
when participants interact with their friends in stag-hunt games (Spearman
q = 0.371, p\ 0.01), while it has no association with the corresponding measure
in entry games (Spearman q = - 0.061, p = 0.596). The same finding is also robust
when controlling for other friendship characteristics such as friends’ perceived
interpersonal similarities and the frequency of their past interactions (Model 2 and
3, Table 4). Specifically, perceived similarities decrease the log odds of UP choices
in entry games, while the frequency of past interactions interacts with the game
environment in predicting choices. Correlational analysis suggests that perceived
similarity among friends is negatively associated with UP actions when friends
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Fig. 1 Impact of friendship on tacit coordination. Curves represent predicted probabilities of choosing UP
actions (y-axis) across different values of a sure payoff (x-axis), when interacting with either friends (blue
solid lines) or strangers (red dashed lines) in both stag-hunt games (circle marker) and entry games
(triangle marker). The predicted probabilities were obtained from Model 1 mixed-effects logistic
regression. Error bands represent 95% confidence bands of the fixed effects
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coordinate in entry games (Spearman q = - 0.272, p = 0.016), but not in stag-hunt
games (Spearman q = - 0.132, p = 0.250), while the correlations between the
frequency of past interactions and UP choices are not significant in either game
(stag-hunt game: Spearman q = 0.133, p = 0.246; entry game: Spearman
q = - 0.079, p = 0.494). In synthesis, friendship quality appears to play a role in
fostering ‘‘assurance’’ in stag-hunt games; perceived interpersonal similarities could
deter friends from entering in entry games, while frequency of past interactions has
a small negative impact in stag-hunt games that does not appear robust in light of
correlational analysis.
3.2 Friendship and prosocial behaviour
A mixed logistic effect model on prosocial behaviour (i.e., we code the variable
prosocial actions as 1 if UP choice in the stag-hunt or SP choice in the entry game
and 0 otherwise) shows a highly significant interaction between friendship and the
game environment (Table 5, Appendix C): friendship significantly increases the log
odds of prosocial actions in both the stag-hunt and the entry game; however, the
effect is significantly reduced in the entry game, as suggested by the significant
interaction between friendship and game. Consistently, Fig. 4 (Appendix C) shows
stronger effects of friendship on prosocial actions in stag-hunt game than in entry
games.
3.3 Friendship and trembling
Mixed logistic effect models on trembling (Table 6, Appendix C) reveal a
significant two-way interaction between the game environment and friendship,
suggesting that friendship differentially affects the likelihood that participants
would switch back and forth between actions in the two games: in the stag-hunts,
participants are more likely to ‘‘tremble’’ when playing with strangers rather than
friends. Conversely, relative to strangers, in the entry games, friendship raises the
likelihood of switching one’s choice, albeit non-significantly.
3.4 Friendship, coordination, and earnings
OLS regression models (Table 7, Appendix C) further show that friendship interacts
with the game environment in affecting coordination and payoff rates. Specifically,
friendship benefits both measures in the stag-hunt game, but these advantages are
strongly decreased when passing to entry games.
4 Discussion
In this study, we investigate how friendship affects coordination across experimen-
tal games of strategic complements and substitutes. We find that, relative to
strangers, friends are more likely to choose UP actions in games of strategic
complements (i.e., stag-hunt games). Conversely, relative to strangers, friends are
123
The differential impact of friendship
more likely to choose the SP actions in games with strategic substitutes (i.e., entry
games). In other words, friendship is associated with decreased strategic uncertainty
in stag-hunts, but increased strategic uncertainty in entry games. These friendship
effects are more pronounced at high sure payoff in stag-hunt games, and at low sure
payoff in the entry game. In addition, we find that, in stag-hunts, friends tremble less
than strangers (i.e., they display less violations of monotonicity); they are also more
likely to successfully coordinate their choices and to earn more than strangers.
However, each of these advantages is strongly attenuated or lost entirely in entry
games.
Previous research suggests that social closeness generally has a beneficial impact
on economic interactions (Sect. 1). Our experimental evidence adds to that literature
by showing that such an impact depends on whether the interactions involve
strategic complements or substitutes. In particular, this evidence challenges the
intuitive notion that social closeness is always beneficial in situations involving tacit
coordination.
We speculate that two broad mechanisms may mediate these effects: prosocial
preferences and social inferences. In fact, friends are known to care about each
other’s payoffs more than strangers, namely prosocial preferences are generally
higher among friends than strangers (Jones and Rachlin 2006). Moreover, the payoff
transformations of the games investigated here suggest that, in the stag-hunt game,
friends could choose the UP action more frequently than strangers, because they
want their friends not to lose out; conversely, in the entry game, friends could
choose the UP action less frequently than strangers, because they want to avoid
actions that could damage their friends. Accordingly, when recoding actions as
choices between a prosocial and a non-prosocial action (rather than choices between
UP and SP actions), we find that friendship increases the probability of prosocial
actions in both games. However, we also find that the impact of friendship on
prosocial actions is asymmetric across the games, in that it is reduced in entry
games. We thus suspect that while prosocial motives (e.g., Camerer 2003; Fehr and
Fischbacher 2003; Lange 1999) may contribute to our findings, they are unlikely to
explain them entirely.
On the other hand, the notion of social distance as the ‘‘degree of reciprocity that
subjects believe exist in a social interaction’’ (Hoffman et al. 1996—italics added)
appears intrinsically inferential as it taps on beliefs. Various well-documented
effects of social closeness on economic interactions, along dimensions such as
group membership, have been suggested to primarily rely on beliefs (Guala et al.
2013). Even among strangers, such ‘‘reciprocal expectations’’ have been long
documented in games of economic exchange (Fischer 2009; Rubinstein and Salant
2016) and evolutionary simulations with reciprocal expectations appear to
outperform a number of alternative models in repeated social dilemmas (Fischer
et al. 2013). Moreover, this is psychologically plausible given that is well known
that humans frequently resort to their own thoughts and preferences—and even
recruit the same neural structures—to make inferences about others, especially
when they are perceived as ‘‘close’’, in-groups or similar to themselves (Ames 2004;
Robbins and Krueger 2005; Denny et al. 2012; Benoit et al. 2010). Indeed, if agents
expect that their friends are more likely than strangers to reciprocate their actions,
123
G. Chierchia et al.
this could provide assurance in stag-hunts with an increase in the likelihood of UP
actions, but deterrence from choosing the same action in entry games with the
consequent reduction in the likelihood of UP actions.
To some extent, the ‘‘shadow of the future’’ in the form of possibility to retaliate
and willingness to share money are, for instance, plausibly inherent constituents of
friendship. Given the early stage of research on friendship and economic
interactions, we here opted to investigate full-fledged friendship. Moreover, to
control for the possible shadow of the future effects of friendship, we used the
frequency of past interactions as a proxy for future interactions (Zhang 2001). We
find that the latter has a weak differential effect in the two games, but that it is far
from over-shadowing the effects of friendship quality and similarity on coordina-
tion. Future studies could attempt to isolate the separate contributions of friendship
constituents on coordination. For example, it should be possible to engineer a
stranger treatment with a built-in possibility for participants to share experimental
money; or with opportunities for ‘‘retaliation’’ in subsequent experimental games/
interactions.
5 Conclusions
We find that, relative to strangers, friendship is associated with decreased strategic
uncertainty in games with strategic complements (i.e., two-player stag-hunt game),
but with increased strategic uncertainty in games with strategic substitutes (i.e., two-
player entry game). With regard to other performance proxies, such as trembling,
coordination, and earnings, friendship has a substantially beneficial impact on
games with strategic complements, but these advantages are either attenuated or
entirely lost in games with substitutes. Our evidence adds to the fast-growing
literature on the importance of the social context in explaining economic behaviour
(Charness et al. 2007a, b; Chen and Chen 2011; Kranton 2016; Chierchia and
Coricelli 2015; Ga¨chter et al. 2019) and illustrates the scope for exploring the
differential role of friendship across a variety of strategic situations ranging from
pure coordination games, through mixed-motive games, to pure conflictual (i.e.,
zero-sum) games.
From an applied viewpoint, our findings have also potentially relevant
implications for understanding team production in organizations. In fact, within
organizations, as well as in many daily interactions, decision-makers are embedded
in a social space, and they constantly tune their behaviour onto the ‘‘social
closeness’’ of others. Moreover, their interactions may involve either strategic
complements or substitutes depending on members’ roles, tasks, skills, and
objectives. Our findings provide preliminary insight that friendship need not equally
benefit all types of tasks. Finally, from a theoretical viewpoint, these findings may
prompt new developments for modelling behaviour in strategic interactions across
families of games and social contexts, thus tackling the question of how well-known
gradients in the social space (here dichotomized as friends vs. strangers) may
interact with well-known gradients in the ‘‘strategic space’’ (here dichotomized as
complementarity vs. substitutability) on a larger scale.
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Appendix A
Page 1
Dear participant, 
welcome, and thank you for participating in our experiment on decision-making! 
You will earn a show-up fee of 5.00 $ just for having participated. 
In addition to the show-up fee, you will be able to earn up to 15.00 $ on the basis of your decisions 
(for a potential total of 20.00 $). 
To increase your chances of earning more it is sufficient that you carefully read the brief and simple 
instructions, which we will also read out loud together. 
Remember that there are no right or wrong answers! We are simply interested to know your 
personal preferences. 
It is important that you fully understand the simple tasks and that you never respond randomly as 
this will decrease your payoff and damage the entire research. 
If at any time during the experiment you feel that the tasks are unclear, please do not hesitate to 
raise your hand and an experimenter will immediately assist you. 
From now, until the end of the experiment please refrain from using any personal electronic device. 
This will result in exclusion from the experiment, for both the user and his/her friend. 
We will now proceed to the instructions of the first two games. 
Page 2
GAME 1 and GAME 2
In both games you will be matched with a counterpart in this room.䯠We will tell you if your 
counterpart is the friend you came here with or a stranger. 
Instructions (1 of 4) 
You and your counterpart will both have to choose between two options, "A" and "B", without 
communicating. 
"A" is a dollar amount and, in both games, if you choose it you will obtain "A" dollars no 
matter what your counterpart chooses. 
THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GAME 1 AND GAME 2 IS IN OPTION B. 
In GAME 1, if you choose option B, you will obtain 15.00 $ ONLY IF your 
counterpart also chooses option B, and zero if he/she chooses A. 
In GAME 2, if you choose option B, you will obtain 15.00 $ ONLY IF your 
counterpart DOES NOT choose B, and zero if he/she also chooses B. 
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Page 3
ATTENTION! The exact same rules apply to your counterpart! 
The tables below summarize your payoffs, and those of your counterpart, for each possible 
combination of your choices. Notice that the two games are only, but importantly, distinguished by 
option B. 
You will be required to make many decisions, for different values of A. 
Page 4
"STRANGER" or "FRIEND" COUNTERPART
For each decision you make we will tell you if your current counterpart is a stranger or your friend: 
In the "FRIEND" case you will actually be playing with the friend you came here with. You will not 
be allowed to communicate - attempts to communicate will result in exclusion from the experiment. 
In the "STRANGER" case you will play with a randomly extracted participant in the room.䯠You and 
your "stranger" counterpart will remain anonymous to one another both during and after the 
experiment. 
The only thing that you know about your "stranger counterpart" is that he/she is NOT the friend you 
came with. 
Your "stranger counterpart" will possibly be a different participant every time (as it is random, we 
don't know). 
ATTENTION:IN EITHER CASE YOU WILL NOT KNOW THE 
OUTCOMES OF ANY OF YOUR DECISIONS BEFORE THE END OF 
THE EXPERIMENT! 
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YOUR FINAL PAYOFF
Each game in this experiment will consist of several decisions. However, you will NOT be paid for 
every decision. 
Instead, out of all the decisions you make our computer will extract one of them at random, at the 
end of the session. Everyone will be paid according to that decision only. 
It follows that you cannot accumulate earnings from one decision to the other, since you will be paid 
for only one. 
You don't know which decision will be extracted, therefore we suggest you pay the same attention 
to all of them. 
If one of the decisions from GAME 1 or GAME 2 is extracted you will be paid according to what you 
and your matched counterpart actually chose in that trial. 
Page 5
Page 6
COMPREHENSION QUESTIONNAIRE
To see if everything is clear, to and to assure you that everything is clear for everyone else, we will 
proceed with a questionnaire. 
In the questionnaire you will also see examples of the decisions you will have to make. 
No one will be able to proceed until everyone has correctly answered all the questions. 
If you have any questions during the questionnaire or do not understand why you got a question 
wrong, PLEASE raise your hand and an experimenter will come to assist you. You may also go 
back and read the instructions. 
Page 7 (scrollable)
Below is a screenshot of a typical (though particularly trivial) decision you might have to 
make. Look at this example and answer all the questions below. 
In the trial above, are you playing with a stranger? 
܆ Yes 
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܆ No 
In the decision above, if I choose "A" how much do I earn? (There may be more than one correct 
answer, please select all of them). 
܆ 0, no matter what my counterpart chooses 
܆ 15.00 $, no matter what my counterpart chooses 
܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses B 
܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses A
܆ 0, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses B 0, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses A 
In the decision above, if I choose "B" how much do I earn? (There may be more than one correct 
answer, please select all of them). 
܆ 15.00 $, no matter what my counterpart chooses 
܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses A
܆ 0, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses A
܆ 0 no matter what my counterpart chooses 
܆ 0, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses B 15.00 $, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses B 
In the decision above, if my counterpart chooses "A" how much does he/she earn? (There may be 
more than one correct answer, please select all of them). 
܆ 0, ONLY IF I choose B 0, ONLY IF I choose A
܆ 0, no matter what I choose 
܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF I choose A 15.00 $, no matter what I choose 
܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF I choose B 
In the decision above, if my counterpart chooses "B" how much does he/she earn? (There may be 
more than one correct answer, please select all of them). 
܆ 15.00 $, no matter what I choose 
܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF I choose B
܆ 0, no matter what I choose 0, ONLY IF I choose A 
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܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF I choose A 0, ONLY IF I choose B 
Once I've made my decision, I will know what my counterpart chose before passing to the next 
decision. 
܆ True 
܆ False 
Since I'm playing with my friend I can communicate with him and agree on what choice to make. 
܆ True 
܆ False 
In the decision above, what would you choose? 
܆ A 
܆ B 
Below is a screenshot of another typical (though again trivial) decision you might have to 
make. Look at this example and answer all the questions below. 
In the trial above, are you playing with a stranger? 
܆ Yes 
܆ No 
In the decision above, if I choose "A" how much do I earn? (There may be more than one correct 
answer, please select all of them). 
܆ 0, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses 
܆ A 15.00 $, no matter what my counterpart chooses 
܆ 0, no matter what my counterpart chooses 
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܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses B 
܆ 0, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses B 
܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses A 
In the decision above, if I choose "B" how much do I earn? (There may be more than one correct 
answer, please select all of them). 
܆ 15.00 $, no matter what my counterpart chooses 
܆ 0, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses A
܆ 0, no matter what my counterpart chooses 
܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses B 
܆ 0, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses B 
܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF my counterpart chooses A 
In the decision above, if my counterpart chooses "A" how much does he/she earn? (There may be 
more than one correct answer, please select all of them). 
܆ 0, ONLY IF I choose A
܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF I choose A
܆ 0, ONLY IF I choose B
܆ 0, no matter what I choose  
܆ 15.00 $, no matter what I choose 15.00 $, ONLY IF I choose B 
In the decision above, if my counterpart chooses "B" how much does he/she earn? (There may be 
more than one correct answer, please select all of them). 
܆ 0, ONLY IF I choose B
܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF I choose B 
܆ 15.00 $, ONLY IF I choose A
܆ 0, no matter what I choose
܆ 0, ONLY IF I choose A 15.00 $, no matter what I choose 
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Is it possible that a randomly extracted stranger is actually the friend I came here with? 
܆ Yes 
܆ No 
܆ Maybe 
At the end of the experiment, I will have a chance to discuss with my stranger counterpart the 
decisions we made during the experiment. 
܆ True 
܆ False 
Will I ever know who my stranger counterpart was? 
܆ Yes 
܆ Maybe 
܆ No 
Will my stranger counterpart ever know who i am? 
܆ Yes 
܆ No 
Will I always be playing with the same stranger counterpart? 
܆ Yes 
܆ No 
Will I get paid for all the decisions I make? 
܆ Yes 
܆ No 
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In the decision above, what would you choose? 
܆ A 
܆ B 
If you are sure about your answers, click below to proceed. 䯠If you've responded correctly to all the 
questions, the next screen will ask you for a password. 
Once we have made sure that all responses to this questionnaire are correct and assisted those 
that had difficulties we will give you the password and you will all proceed to the actual games 
together.
Page 1
LOTTERY INSTRUCTIONS
We will now prepare two separate boxes, which are clearly labeled BOX 1 and BOX 2.
In BOX 1 we will put 2 tennis balls: 1 yellow one and 1 blue one, and we will leave the box in plain 
sight. 
In BOX 2 we will put 4 tennis balls: 2 yellow ones and 2 blue ones. We will then remove 2 balls at 
random but we won't know which ones. 
At the end of the session we will extract one tennis ball at random
Page 2
You will have to choose whether to "bet" or "not to bet". 
If you don't bet you will receive a dollar amount "A", no matter which color is extracted. 
If you bet you will receive 15.00 $ ONLY IF one of the two colors is extracted, and zero if the 
other is extracted. 
You will have to make multiple decisions for different values of "A". 
To avoid confusion, you will first make all your decisions for one of the boxes, and then for the other 
(a message will warn you when the switch occurs). 
If you don't have any questions you may start! 
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Appendix B
See Figs. 2, 3.
Fig. 2 Screenshot of the coordination game. In this example, a participant is taking part in a ‘‘stag-hunt
game, in the friendship condition’’ (Sect. 2). Before taking part in the games, participants were asked to
write the name of their friend, which then reappeared in the friendship condition (in this example the
participant’s friend’s name is ‘‘Mark’’). In the stranger condition, one’s friend’s name was replaced with
‘‘a stranger’’. In an ‘‘entry game’’, in the ‘‘B’’ option, the letters ‘‘B’’ and ‘‘A’’ are simply exchanged
Fig. 3 Screenshot of the lottery condition. As for the coordination games, in the lottery condition,
participants were to choose between an uncertain option (‘‘B’’) and a lower paying but certain alternative
(‘‘A’’). The outcome of the uncertain option depended on the extraction of a lottery containing a 1
‘‘winning ball’’ and 1 ‘‘losing one’’
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Appendix C
See Table 5
See Fig. 4
See Tables 6, 7
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Fig. 4 Impact of friendship on prosocial actions. There are four violin plots. Each plot includes a marker
for the median, a box representing the interquartile range, spikes for the upper and lower adjacent values,
and an overlaid estimated kernel density of the data at different values.
Table 5 Prosocial choices:
mixed-effects logistic
regressions
Estimation method: mixed-effects logistic
Controls for individual effects: clustering
Dependent variable: prosocial choice (dummy)
Sure payoff 0.231*** (0.014)
Stag-hunt game (dummy) 4.849*** (0.184)
Stag-hunt game*Sure payoff - 0.556*** (0.019)
Friend counterpart (dummy) 0.478*** (0.151)
Friend counterpart*Sure payoff - 0.024 (0.018)
Stag-hunt game*Friend counterpart 1.235*** (0.147)
Constant - 1.344*** (0.146)
No. observations 6196
No. individuals 78
Log-likelihood - 2989.958
(Robust) Standard errors are in parentheses
***Significance at the 1% level
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Table 6 Trembling and
friendship: mixed-effects
logistic regressions
Estimation method: mixed-effects logistic
Controls for individual effects: clustering
Dependent variable: threshold (dummy)
Sure payoff - 0.066*** (0.015)
Stag-hunt game (dummy) - 2.415*** (0.198)
Stag-hunt game*Sure payoff 0.178*** (0.020)
Friend counterpart (dummy) - 0.066 (0.164)
Friend counterpart*Sure payoff 0.011 (0.018)
Stag-hunt game*Friend counterpart - 0.366** (0.152)
Constant - 0.578*** (0.142)
No. observations 5848
No. individuals 78
Log-likelihood - 2615.490
(Robust) Standard errors are in parentheses
***Significance at the 1 percent level
**Significance at the 5 percent level
Table 7 Coordination and earnings: OLS regressions
Estimation method: ordinary least square
Controls for individual effects: clustering
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent variable: Coordination rates Payoff rates
Stag-hunt game 0.251*** (0.011) 2.675*** (0.098)
Friend counterpart 0.047** (0.022) 0.613*** (0.204)
Stag-hunt game*Friend counterpart 0.097*** (0.027) 1.400*** (0.319)
Constant 0.411*** (0.008) 8.302*** (0.040)
No. observations 312 312
No. individuals 78 78
R2 0.568 0.604
(Robust) Standard errors are in parentheses
***Significance at the 1 percent level
**Significance at the 5 percent level
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Appendix D
See Fig. 5
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